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Abstract 
Brokenness saturates the finite realm that is human-bcjng. The 
lion's share of twentieth century thinkers have responded to 
brokenness by tending towards violence and nihiljsm. In contrast, 
French Christian existentialist and playwright, Gabriel Marcel, docs 
not. Marcel offers that brokenness is the threshold of human 
experience, not its totalit-y. Marcel offers brokenness as the loving 
threshold of human experience, not its meaningless conclusion. My 
thesis attempts to locale Marcel in the dialogue of twentieth century 
philosophy and aims to point to his thought as a viable alternative lo 
brutality and ego. 
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Introduction 
Listening 
Tfte horror oftlte Twentieth Century was the size of 
each new e"ent, and the paucity of its reverberation. 
Norman Mailer, A Fire on the Moon 
The plot of the twentieth century boasts a string of titanic events, each 
punctuated by an appeal to progress: the light bulb, world wars, the 
automobile, nuclear war, television, genocide, antibiotics, the holocaust, 
space travel, and environmental collapse define an era of unmatched 
innovation on one hand, and peerless devastation on the other. It is 
because of the dichotomy between ingenuity and demolition, and the 
sheer magnitude of the events in q ucstion, that the twentieth century is 
best understood as epic: essentially without precedent. 
Thus we arc burdened with an unprecedented question: Ilow are we to 
be in the wake of the twentieth century? Until now it appears that our 
dialogue in this regard has been left to Ilcidegger, and understandably 
so. Ilcideggcr's notion of being is proportional to the Herculean 
character of the twentieth century itself. But, this call and response 
between giants, history and Heidegger, has not satisfied the question. I 
therefore offer a radical and dramatic intervention: a step away from 
grandeur, a movement inward. 
Gabriel Marcel's voice in philosophy's script is unfairly overshadowed b 
a number of his contemporaries: most notably Sartre and Ilcidcggcr. 
This oversight is not owed to inferior thought, nor irrelevance of topic; 
instead this inaUcnLion may be due to something as simple as bad Liming: 
the twentieth century being Heidcgger's time to dominate. Marcel's bid 
to uncover the immediacy of the human condition appears humble when 
compared to the epic sweep of I-Icidcggcr's philosophical vision. Thus, it 
is because Marcel has willingly failed at playing Goliath that we must 
revisit his thought. 
Please understand that my intention is not anti-Hcidcggerian, nor is it 
strictly pro-Marcclian. I aim, rather, to listen for Marcel's voice in the 
context of our current situation. It must also be made clear that I am not 
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pro posing a dialogue between Ileidegger and Marcel, not j usL ycL at least. 
I intend only Lo interrupt, however briefly, our conversation with 
Ileidcggcr so that Marcel may be heard. 
Marcel has been labeled an existentialist, a Christian convert 1, a Christian 
existentialist, a nco-Socratic, a nco-Platonist, a nco-Bcrgsonian, a 
pseudo-phenomenologist, a philosopher of peace, a dramatist, a drama 
critic, a musician, a husband, father, colleague and fricnd 2 . Marcel 
himself has shown little inclination towards those titles from the first half 
of this list, preferring instead Lo identify with the laLLcr caLcgorics3 . For 
our purposes here it is important to note the diversity of Marcel's 
interests, as Marcel's thought is incarnate across various genres. 
lie begins his exploration of reality with the immediate: with sense; noL 
mere sense experience, but sense LhaL is common. lL is the common sense 
1 Marcel converted lo Christianity, specifi cally Roman Catholicism, as an adu lt 
in 1929. 
2 J end this list with friend because in reading Marcel you feel a gen uine 
tenderness towards him as a philosopher, buL more importanlly as a human. 
2 Gabriel Marcel, "A n AuLobiographical Essay" in Tlze Plulosopfz.y of Gabriel Marcel, 
ed. Paul Ar·thur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin llahn , (Open Court Publishing 
Company: La Salle, lllinois, 1984) p. li8-49. 
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· of being: a sense of the ontological, that Marcel holds as ccnlral. On the 
other hand, it is the loss of this sense that Marcel dreads. 
The 'broken world' is a comment on the loss of sense: of human essence, 
through technology, or function, and is discussed in The Philosophy of 
Existence (1954), and more subtly in the dramatic work The Broken World 
(1973). 
I must emphasize that the broken in broken world does not imply that the 
world was ever whole, or that a philosophical band-aid might unify it. 
Rather, the broken world is broken in essence, and stands in wait to be 
further fragmented by the events of history. In this way, Marcel docs not 
endeavor to heal the world; in fact, he aims to honor its brokenness. 
Brokenness constitutes the shape of humanity, for Marcel. Brokenness is 
the threshold of human experience. It is the unwilling nature of man who 
fails to reflect and lranscend, preferring instead to glory in the 
particularity of menial tasks or functions, that conlributes to this fissure 
and fragmentation. Ontological exigence is stilled by an unconscious 
relativism that discounts the personal, "ignores the lragic and denies the 
4 
transcendcnt"4 . Marcel is aiming at Lranscendcncc5 through lived 
experience. Deed solidifies the unity of being and Lransccnding: the 
surpassing of threshold through aclion. 
Not surprisingly, this call to action and Marcel's message of brokenness is 
echoed by the political wake-up call demanded by Giorgio Agambcn and 
Frantz Fanon, among others. However, where Agambcn and Fanon 
celebrate violence, Marcel concludes that all action must be grounded in 
active reflection. More importantly perhaps, Marcel holds that just 
because the world is broken, man is not obligated to follow suit. The role 
of the philosopher, artist, or priest, is to point to our brokenness so that 
we might move beyond it: transcend. Marcel states: 
4 Gabriel Marcel, The PhilosoplzyofExistence, trans. Manya llar·a.ri, (The Harvill 
Press Ltd.: London, 1954) p. 5-6. 
5 Marcel makes a conscious effort to employ common language in his 
philosophical texts. l-fi s use of the word transcendent docs not hinge on prior 
knowledge of Plato or Kant, nor docs it relate to forms or systems. Rather , 
transcending r·efers to a movement above and beyond , a surpassing of the 
ordinary. Such a movement, for Marcel, is not reserved for the philosopher 
king but, is a real possibili ty for each member of the community . 
5 
Philosophy must bring to light the profound but 
usual(y inarticulated uneasiness man experiences in 
this technocratic or bureaucratic milieu where what is 
deepest in him is not only ignored but continually 
trampled underfoot. 6 
Marcel offers us an opportunity for transformation grounded in 
thoughtful reflection. We arc not to retrogress into the violent savagery 
of power, or isolation, we are to transcend the threshold offered to us by 
brokenness. 
6 Gabriel Marcel, Tragic WiSdom and Beyond, trans. Stephen Jolin and Peter 
McCormick, (Northwest University Press: Evanston , 1973) p. 1/t. 
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Chapter 1 
Broken World in Philosophy 
Lifo in a world centered on jiuzction is liable LO 
despair because in reality this world is empty, it rings 
hollow. 
Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existence 
One way into Marcel's concept of brokenness lies with what I term, if 
unimaginaLivcly, Lhefragmented man7 . The fragmented man is an 
individual who appears to herself, and indeed Lhe world at large, as 
noLhing more Lhan a collection of functions8 . The fragmented man has 
forced the idea of funcLion to its limits, thus destroying any inclination 
toward curiosit : she has "[misplaced] the idea of function, Laking 
function in its current sense which includes both the vital and the social 
7 While fragmentation is the eond iLion of the broken world , it is not necessary 
that man himself be broken . The brokenness of man is not essential but 
acquired through unreflective functional activity and total denial of imagination 
and transcendence. 
8 Gabriel Marcel , Tlze PhilosoplzyoflixisLence, ll<UlS. Mauya llarari , (HarviiJ Press 
Ltd .: London, 1954) p. 1. 
7 
functions. "9 We can conceive of this functional individual most plainly as 
a sum of her parts: a sum of her functions. Marcel slates: 
I should like lO start with. a sort of global and 
intuitive characterization of the man in whom the 
sense of the ontological- the sense of being- is lacking, 
or, to speak more correclfy, of the man who has lost 
the awareness in this sense. Generally speaking, 
modern man in his condition; if ontological demands 
worry h.im at all, it is only dully, as an obscure 
impulse. 10 
Marcel offers the underground rail worker: opening doors or punching 
tickets, for whom work, sleep, nourishment, recreation, and 
(heterosexual) sex are all registered on the to do list: logged on the time 
table 11 , to epitomize the fragmented man. For her, the inner reflection 
that delivers meaning to action is lost: intention ceases. She opens the 
9 Gabriel Marcel, ThePhilosoplzyofE.xistence, lrans. Manya Jlarari , (llarviiJ Pt·css 
Lid.: London , 1954) p. 1. 
10 Gabriel Marcc1, TlzePhilosophyofE:r:istence, trans. Manya J larari , (llarvill Pres 
LI-d.: London , 1954) p. l. 
11 Gabriel Marcel, TlzePizilosopfzyofE.ristence, trans. Manya Ilarari , (11arvill Press 
LLd.: London, 1954) p. 2. 
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door Lo the underground because it is her job, not because people 
require access to the trains. We may just as easily consider the modern 
office worker, bound to their unit in a cubical catacomb, as exemplifying 
the fragmented man. For this individual, meals, vacation and bathroom 
breaks arc scheduled. The call centre allendant, whose job it is to answer 
phones and interact with other human beings, works from a script and is 
discouraged from stepping outside the confines of the page. The soldier 
offers up her life not because of any necessary emotional or moral 
motivation, but because the state demands it. The common man is also 
arguably dulled by the demands of society: go to school, get a job, get 
married, have children, retire, and die. Our lives are planned out for us, 
and as such, active intention is lost. This general stale of ignorance and 
apathy defines us as a broken society. 
The notion of broken society, or more specifically the broken citizen, is 
taken up in the work of Giorgio Agambcn who presents us with a foil to 
the fragmented man: homo sacer. For Agambcn, following Michel 
9 
Foucault12, the modern political landscape is a manufactured terrain 
wherein the rule of law has created cilizens and alienated human beings. 
Just as the functional demands of work, family and community have 
taken over in Marcel's fragmented man, so too has mass politicalizalion 
taken over in Agamben's citizen. But, there is a difference between the 
two: where the fragmented man is unable to imagine and transcend, the 
cilizen is unable ground herself in her own animal nature 13 . 
12 And to some extent Marcel. 
13 A similar distinction occurs, according Lo Hegel, in Greek clhicaJ life whereby 
divine law represents lhc natural, and human law represents the conslruclcd . 
s such, the A ntigone stOI)' provides an aJlegory whereby nature and 
construction stand al odds. Sophocles' Antigone is the finaJ inslaJimcnl in the 
Oedipus trilogy of tragedy. Set againsllhe backdrop of civil war, Oedipus' sons, 
Antigone's brothers, Polyneices and Eteocles, have sla in each other in battle; as 
such the unfolding drama is an expounding of civiJ war: the inherent con Oict of 
e thics' duaJ authorities: human and divine law. Creon, king of Thebes and 
A11tigone's uncle, comes down on Lhe side of human law, proclaiming Lhal 
Po1yneices, as enemy of Lhe polis, must nol be afforded the right of bm·ial, but 
instead must remain on the battlefi eld as carrion. Conversely, Antigone holds 
that Polyneices must be buried, as that is con·ecl action, dictated by divine law. 
Antigone eventuaJJy denies lhe wishes of lhe slate and her uncle, in order to 
fuJ(iJI divine law, and bm·ies h er brother. As a result, Creon punishes her for 
breaking wi1J1 human law and has Antigone imprisoned in a eave, where she 
eventually commits suicide. Creon's wife and son , Haemon who is betrothed to 
Antigone, Lake the ir own lives, leaving lhe solitary figure of Creon aJone and 
wilhoul hope. 
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Agambcn calls for reform: the move from indifference, institution, and law 
to love, faith and <Jiolence. This movement may occur only from the death 
of Lhe rule of law and Lhe subsequent reign of violence brought about by 
the movement towards biopolitics. The new state of violence is Lhus 
legitimated by the current tendency towards biopolitical regimes and away 
from the weary rule of law. The political is no longer about big ideas; it is 
about what we, as bodies, have the power to do. 
Agambcn describes the distinction between bios and zoe as Lhc difference 
between qualified life and biological life: political life and bare life. 
The Greeks had no single term to express what we 
mean by the word 'life'. They used two terms that, 
although traceable to a common etymological root, 
are semantically and metaphorically distinct: zoe, 
which expressed the simple fact of living common to 
all living beings (animals, men, or gods), and bios, 
which indicated the form or the way of living proper 
. d .. d I 14 to an zn wz ua or a group. 
14 C iorgio Agamhen, Homo Sacer Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel 
HeUer- H.oazen (Stanford University Press: California, 1998) p. 1. 
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Criticism of the rule of law in light of Agamben's life distinction may be 
thus: Aristotle's political animal has given way to a political citizen that 
can no longer reconcile his animality with his political being. That is, 
through our experience as political beings, under the rule of law, we arc 
alienating our animal side: we arc losing the natural to the constructed15 . 
The citizen, Aristotle's political animal stripped of hi s animality, i , 
however, just one side of the bios/ zoe distinction. Agamben names the 
other side of the political subject: homo sacer. 1-fomo sacer is an outsider, 
pecifically one who is outside of the law16. 1-fomo sacer, or sacred man, i 
a criminal, punished through Roman law and sentenced to a life outside 
of the political community. She may be killed by any one individual 
without threat of recourse. However, as the laws of the state no longer 
apply to her, homo sacer may not be killed by the state; she may not be the 
sacrificial offering in religious ritual17. Homo sacer is both outside the 
15 Just as Jlobbes sets up two opposing forces in Leviathan: U1e natural slate of a 
war of all against alJ, and the a1·tificial construction of the social contract, so 
too, the contemporary era takes up the juxtaposition of nature and artifice. 
16 In contemporary context: tJ1e migrant or the Vancouver prostitute. 
17 Giorgio Aga:mben, lfomo Sacer Sovereign Power and Bare Life, tJ·ans. Daniel 
ll eller- Roazen (Stanford University Press: California, 1998) p. 71-74. 
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state and connected to it: as such, she can be understood as a reflection 
of Hobbes' sovereign who also stands with one foot inside, and one foot 
outside of the law18. Both homo sacer and the sovereign avoid the pitfalls 
of broken society by standing apart from it. 
Standing apart from society, no matter how broken it may be, is 
problematic for Marcel as setting one's self off to one side on] y serves to 
further man's brokenness. This position rests in Marcel's view of 
ontology, which is communal rather than individual. Marcel offers, in his 
forward to Mystery of Being Faith and Reality, that the question of being is 
not contained in the utterance I think, but in the statement: We are19 . 
The /think, the ground of Cartcs.ianism, fails to recognize the world as 
communal and, as such, the I .is unable to see the big picture. Marcel 
18 The problem of the sovereign and the homo sacer in the light of the rule of 
law is thus the same: both straddle the zones of law and lawlessness and thus 
may be considered as apart from the remainder of society. The difference 
between the two however, is that the sovereign becomes, in a certain light, a 
tyrant, whi le the homo sacer, the non-citizen, the true outcast, becomes the 
new revolutionary. 
l must also note that while I point to Hobbes' sovereign, Agambcn picks up 
Schmiu's notion of the state of exception to make the same point. 
19 Gabriel Marcel, Mystery of Being 2. Faith and Reality, tt·ans Rene I laugc 
(Gateway Edition Henry Regncry Company: Chicago, 1968) p. v. 
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equates this failure to bfindness20, where blindness is to be understood as 
undiscriminating. The Cartesian mantra will never illuminate the totality 
of being I: the I think does not account for community and as such I 
cannot know myself as part of a community21 . Egocentricity highlights 
the I that is zoe, but cannot shed light on the I that is bios. 
Thus Marcel holds that understanding of you and me rests with a starling 
point that is we. That is, being is grounded in us: in we: being is 
communal. It is the tension between being individual and being in 
society that makes one sided characters, such as homo saccr, useless lo 
Marcel. Reconciliation of the zoe/bios life distinction must begin from the 
standpoint of community. 
Marcel slates: 
First, we must understand that this enquiry [into 
being) can be de()efoped only if we take a certain 
fullness of life as our startingpoint; secondly, we mllst 
20 Gabriel Marcel, Mystery of Being 2. Faith andRea!ity, trans Rene Hauge 
(Gateway Edition Henry Regnery Company: Chicago, 1968) p. 8. 
2 1 Gabriel Marcel, Mystery ofBeing 2. Faith and Reality, trans Rene llaugc 
(Gateway Edition Henry Regnery Company: Chicago, 1968) p. 8. 
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at the same time note well that this fullness of life can 
in no circumstances be that of my own personal 
experience considered in an exdusi<Jefy pri<Jale 
aspect, considered in as much as it is just mine; rather 
it must be that of a whole which is implied by the 
relation with, by togetherness . . . 22 
We arc asked by Marcel lo start from we: we are asked lobe a parl of each 
other: lo participate. Here Marcel offers something different from many 
of his predecessors, and something that has been forgotten by many of 
h . 1· . all . 23 d 24 Th . 1s po 1L1c y astute contemporaries an successors . ere IS a 
tendency, and indeed a history, of placing the philosopher over and 
against society, giving her special status: Plato's solitary pfulosopher leaves 
the shadows as a lone individual and returns from enlightenment only lo 
be murdered by the cave dwelling mob. Marcel, the philosopher, asks 
Lhal we resist the urge lo segregate, perhaps more importantly; Marcel 
asks that we resist the urge to deify the philosopher and the martyr. We 
musl participate, live, act, in order to transcend. 
22 Gabriel Marcel, Mystery of Being 2. Faith and Reality, trans Rene Hauge 
(Gateway Edition Henry Regnery Company: Chicago, 1968) p. 9-10. 
23 Notably Sarlre. 
24 Notably Levinas. 
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Chapter 2.1 
Broken World Incarnation 
Marcel el Bergson Caught in the Act 
1 ndeed, 1 think 1 can say that, among all those whose 
courses 1 took, .f1enri Bergson was the only one whose 
thoughts and words took a sure and fasting hold on 
me. To get a seat in the fiufe hall of College de 
France, where he taught, one had to arrive an hour 
early and thus listen to (I would rather say undergo) 
the preceding class. As I have ofien said, what was 
marvelous and perhaps unique in Bergson was that 
during each lecture he conveyed a sense of proceeding 
in a sort of interior jubilation in a labor of discovery 
in which listeners were to participate. 25 
Gabriel Marcel, An Autobiographical Essay 
In an effort to locale Marcel in the dialogue of twentieth century 
philosophy it is imperative to point to Henri Bergson's influence. This 
influence, however, extends far beyond mere context. As indicated by the 
above quote, and hinted at in the introduction, Marcel was Bergson's 
student and was taken in very early by the notions of participation and 
25 Gabriel Marcel, "AnAutobiograplzicalhssay" in The PhilosophyofCabriel 
Marcel, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin llahn, (Open Court 
Publishing Company: La Salle, lllinois, 1984) p. 576. 
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activity. Although both minds merge and diverge on a variety of topics, it 
is the notion of activity that proves to be the heart of their relationship, 
and also th point of interest for our purpose. 
Activity is implicit in Bergson through his notions of pure mobility, 
creativi ty, frc will, change and, most famously, duree. 
Duree, duration, is associated with three examples in B rg on's An 
Introduction lO Metaphysics. The last of Bergson's illustrations is that of an 
clastic band. The band is contracted at a mathematical point and then 
drawn out indefinitely to create a line. This line, without a limit, grow 
increasingly longer and longcr26 . Bergson's emphasis is not on the line 
itself as mere object, but on the motion of the line extending: the action 
of the line lengthening. Thus, durcc is depicted here as an indivisible 
b .l. 27 . mo 1 1t : as pure actwn. 
26 J lenri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. T. E. llulrnc, (llackcll 
Publishjng Company: indianapolis; Cambridge, 1999) p. 26. 
27 ln actual fact dur·ation is not expr·c sed fu11y by this e ample, or an other. 
This illustration does however shed light on Lhe importance of motion and thus 
activit in Bergson. 
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The first note of Marcel's dissent from Bcrgsonianism came in the form 
of a challenge. Marcel challenged Bergson's association of being and the 
static in the last chapter of L 'Evolution Creatrice, preferring a more alii,Je28 
characterization of the ontological. In later work Marcel would challenge 
Bergson further, aiming for a grounded approach to activity. Marcel 
stales in Tragic Wis-dom and Beyond: 
As numerous philosophers, including Bergson, ha(Je 
seen, the relationship between auention and freedom 
is' (Jery close. This is what seems to escape entirely 
those philosophers who, with Sartre, interpret 
freedom as fundamentally a lack or pri(Jation. My 
attention, I would say, is' the measure of my freedom. 
This formula has the advantage of displaying the 
central fact that freedom can only arbitrarily be 
dissociated from some kind of reforence to the real, 
that is', from embodiment. I am not Sllre that the word 
28 Gabriel Marcel, "Response to Sam Keen" in ThePhilosophyofCabriefMarcel, cd. 
Pau l Arlhur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin Hahn , (Open Court Publishing 
Company: La Salle, lllinois, 1984) p. 99. 
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freedom means anything if we try to apply it to an 
omniscient and incorporeal being. 29 
Marcel's criticism calls for a notion of being that is 'real', corporeal. Thu 
Marcel is continuing the Bergsonian project by stretching the band of 
activity around the groundcdncss of human-being. Marcel is looking to 
root the existential in the empirical30. As uch, we must consider Marcel 
as a Nco-Bcrgsonian: as a belie cr in all things active o long as the 
activity is embodied. It is in Marcel that Bergson's durcc begins its 
second life as act. 
29 Gabrjel Marcel , Tragic Wisdom and Beyond, tTans. Stephe n Jolin and PC'lcr 
McCormick, (N01thwcsl University P1·c s: Evanston , 1973) p. xx iii . 
30 Sam Keen , "The De<Jelopmelll ofLize Idea of Being in Marcel's Thought " in Tlze 
PlulosophyofCabriel Marcel, ed. Paul Arlhur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin llahn, 
(Open Courl Publishing Company: La aile, Illinois, 19811) p. 99. 
19 
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Chapter 2.2 
Broken World Incarnation 
The Embodied Aesthetic 
The idea of being creative ... always implies the idea 
of being open La wards others. 
Gabriel Marcel, Man Against Mass Society 
Man's transcendence is reliant on man's status as an actor; a status thaL 
enjoys double meaning in Marcel. The first instance of mart as actor is the 
active man, the antithesis of the fragmented man. The acliv man move 
be ond mere function through engagement with the world at large. She 
is reflective, she is intelligent: she is part of the communal e perience. 
The second instance of mart as actor is to be taken literally: in the 
theatrical sense; therefore the role of art, specifically theatr , is to be 
given seriou thought. 
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As indicated, Marcel is a man of many talents and titles, however he is 
best known as a philosopher and a playwright31. The rcJation between 
these two genre i not to be overlooked as Marcel's pla s rna be viewed 
as the incarnation of his philosophical writing, or conv r el as 
MacKinnon puts it: Marcel has "wriuen highly individual philosophy, 
partly as the frui t of reflection on h is work as dramatist. "32 In truth, the 
relationship between these genres is probably one of mutual inspiration 
as Marcel offer : 
The retrospection in which 1 am now considering my 
work in its entirety enables me lO confirm that this 
llnily between my philosophical and dramatic work 
describes without a doubt what is most original as we!! 
. 1" "b . 33 as nwst essentza zn my contrz utzons. 
31 Marcel's autobiography points to his f•·ustralion at the ucce of his 
p hilosoph ical discourse in comparison to the relative obscurity or his dramatic 
works. 
32 Donald M. MacKi nnon, "DramaandMemory"in The PhilosophyofCabriel 
Marcel , ed. Pau l Arthur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin Hahn, (Open Court 
Publ ishing Company: La Sal le, Illinois, 1984) p. 576. 
33 Gabriel Marcel, "Response to Donald MacKinnon" in Tlze Philosophy of Gabriel 
Marcel, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin Hal1n, (Open Court 
Publishing Cornpatl : La Salle, lll inois, 198ft) p. 581. 
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In this way, we must explore the medium of drama as part of our dialogue 
with Marcel, as the dramatic appears to be a part of Marcel's need for 
being, his ontological cx.igcnce. 
Marcel's words are mediated by the genre in which they arc written, and 
demand a relationship with Marcel, his actors, and his audience. In this 
way, the medium of drama allows Marcel to deliver his message through 
the actors on stage. The nature of the diiTerencc between Marcel's notion 
of the broken world .in his philosophical and dramatic work might be be t 
understood as a matter of embodiment: as a philosophical text is to be 
read and drama is to be performed. A way into discussion of Marcel as a 
dramatist thus rests with the notion of embodiment, or incarnation. 
22 
Marcel's notion of embodiment, taken up by Maurice Mcrlcau-Ponty34 in 
the Phenomenology of Perception, i wrapped up in the concepts of being 
and having. Marcel holds that just a the unity of being and transcending 
culminates in the deed, the unit of being and having i located in the 
body. Marcel's Being and !laving, part of his exislenlia/ diary, is an 
extension of the contention that everything comes down to the 
distinction between what we have and what we are35 . There i a firm 
difference between having a hous and being hospitable; con crsel 
when we believe, we do not have a belief: we arc a belief. A body 
however; more specifically my body, straddles both realms, as my body is 
both something that I ha c and something that I am. In thi way, the 
relationship between the bod and being and having must be understood 
as a both/and, as oppose to an either/or relation. 
34 Merleau-Ponty holds that one's body is not mere ly an objecL (a having), but 
that the body is itself the condi tion for experie nce. (Maurice Mcrl('au -Ponly, 
Phenomenology of Perception, 2002) 
35 Gabriel Marcei, Beingandflavingan Existential Diary, lrans. Katherine 
Farrer, (lla l'p('r & Row: ew York, 1965) p. 155. 
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My relation to my body is not ali ficd by the lone phra c: I have a bod . 
This is the case as this statement makes possible a disassociation between 
me and m bod . In this way, I now Land in relation lo m bod , thus 
becoming a force apart from it. In this instance of alienation, the bod in 
question cease to be my body and must be viewed as a body .in general: I 
stand over and against the shell that is my body. Marcel contends that 
this view is incomplete as there exist a bond between me and m bod 
Coover ly, the statement: I am my body, lacks fulln a w ll. This i 
the case a once I connect myself to a bod , the bod in question ceases 
to be something that I have; my bod i me; my body is what I am. The 
difficulty here is that if one is their body, then that is all they arc. Loosing 
a limb, or other appendage, would thus mean that one wa less than 
whole. The Tom Lop pard play Rock 'N' Roll explores thi onccpl 
through the relationship between an aging, maleriali L, philo ophcr and 
his wife, who is dying with terminal cancer: 
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Eleanor: 
Max: 
Eleanor: 
Max: 
Eleanor: 
Max·: 
(breaks) I don't rare! I don't care about it! 
Stay in- get out-1 don't care, Max·! 
What is it? Whal 's happened? 
It s you. My body is telling me I'm nothing 
without it, and you're telling me the same. 
No ... No. 
You are, Max! Its as if yotL 'rein cahoots, you 
and my cancer. 
Oh God- Nell. 
lie tries LO hold her. Weeping, she won't be held. 
Eleanor: They've cuL, cauterized and zapped away my 
breasts, my ovaries, my womb, half my bowel, 
and a nutmeg oul of my brain, and I am 
undiminished. I'm ex·actfy who I've always 
been. I am not my body. My body is nothing 
without me, that's the tnllh of it. 
She tears open her dress 
Look at it, what's lefl of it. It does classics. it 
does halfarsedfeminism, it does love, desire, 
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Max: 
Eleanor: 
jealousyandfear- Christ, does it do fear!- So 
who's the me who s still in one piece? 
1 know that- 1 know your mind is everything. 
(furious) Don't you dare, Max- don't you dare 
reclaim that word now. 1 don't want your 
'mind' which you can make out of beer cans. 
Don 't bring it to my funeral. 1 want yollr 
grieving soul or nothing. 1 do not wanl your 
amazing biological machine- 1 want what you 
love me with. 
She hits bouom and stays there. Max waits, not comforting her. 
Then he crouches close to her. 
Max: Butthats what I love you with. That :s-it. 
There s nothing else. 36 
Through his careful dialogue, Stop pard points to crux of whal being 
body alone suggesls: Lhal being body amounls to being the sum of parls 
and nothing greater. 
36 Tom Sloppard, Rock andRoll, (Faber and Faber: London, 2006) p. 56-58. 
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Being without having rules out the possibility of transcendence; 
transcendence is the essential element to human life, not so that we may 
heal the broken world but so that we may recognize brokenness. Likewise 
having without being entails disconnect, where body is alienated from 
self. To avoid emptiness, the statement: 'I am body' must share the same 
breath as 'I have a body' in order to express what the experience of my 
body is. In this way, the combination of being and having through 
embodiment in the human form is the path to transcendence. Further 
incarnation of this contention lies in Marcel's philosophical participation 
as a playwright. 
I have touched on Marcel's broken world as a philosophical concept 
linked to the broken man, however philosophy is not the limit of the 
broken world. Marcel takes issue with the malaise of modernity in his 
play L e Monde Casser: The Broken World. The genre of theatre allows for 
the movement of theoretical to practical: from paper to body. In this way, 
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the lead character Christiane embodies the broken world theme, as she 
ultimately finds no satisfaction in the simulacrum that is polite society. 
Christiane: 
D enise: 
Christiane: 
(solemnly) Don't you have the impression that 
we are living ... if we calf it that living ... in a 
broken world? Yes, broken like a watch that 
has stopped. Its main spring no longer works. 
To aft appearances nothing has changed. 
Everything is in its place. But if yott put the 
watch to your ear ... you hear nothing. 
Remember, the world, or what we call the 
world, the human world . .. used to have a 
heart. But it seems that heart has slopped 
beating. Lawrence codifies regulations, Daddy 
has season tickets at the Symphony and keeps 
a mistress on the cheap, .1/enry is preparing a 
trip around the world ... 
Oh! 1 didn't know. 
Antonov conducts rehearsals of his symphonic 
poem. Everyone ha'i their own liLLie niche, 
their own liLLie thing, their own pet~y interests. 
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Denise: 
Christiane: 
Denise: 
Christiane: 
D enise: 
Christiane: 
Denise: 
Christiane: 
D enise: 
Christiane: 
People meet, or more accurately, bllmp into 
each other. That makes q aiLe a racket. 
flow else could it be? 
(Following her thought) But Lheres no centre, 
no life, anywhere. 
And where are yo11 in all oftlzis? 
Me ... lets say, I listen. 
In a <Jacuum? 
You said iL, in a <Jacwun. 
And the resl of the Lime? 
I sllppose ... 1 exist. I am whaL you might call a 
"b " usywoman. 
(Biuerly) I can't stand such talk. Actually all 
LhaL means ... 
Don 'L starl again, Denise. 
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Denise: If you would aL feast recognize ... 
Christiane: S b I ' · L "0 {; • 37 orry, ut · won t gzve you Lftal satzs1 acllon. 
The actors that portray Christiane and Denise in this scene arc literally 
the embodiment of the words that Marcel has given them. Thus the actor 
is the located-ness of concept: idea in a phenomenological body. The 
word is now accessible through the medium of body: an audience can 
stare the message in the face : the word is communion passed through the 
actors onto their audience. 
In this way, the nature of the engagement has a profound impact on the 
audience, as the solitary act of reading a text differs from the social act of 
attending a performance. It is not what happens to me when I utter my 
37 Gabriel Marcel, Perspectives on a Broken World, Lrans. Kalharine Rose II an ley, 
(Marqueltc University Press: Milwaukee, 1998) p. 46-47. 
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lines, but the collective engagement of an audience of individuals Lhat is 
kc/8 . Marcel slates: 
1 should say that in the case particularly of the lrlle 
artist in paint, or stone, or music, or words this 
relationship with the transcendent is something that is 
experienced in the most authentic and profound 
way.39 
Marcel seeks to call his audience into m stery 40 by pr en ling them with 
the corporeal: Marcel's use of the dramatic Lhus entices his audience and 
38 The post-modern account contends that art is in the response of the 
audience; a such the audience may have a bigger role to play in the area of' the 
arts in comparison to literature. 
39 Gabriel Marcel, Man Against Mass ociety, trans. C. S. Fra cr (Gateway 
Edition: Chicago, 1967) p. 23. 
40 Problem and mystery are closely associated with the broken wodd as Marcel 
slates that the broken world is such that "on the one hand [it is] riddled with 
problems and, on the other, determined to allow no room for mystery". The 
broken woi'Jd is instead the realm of problems which do HOt dcp •ud Oll 
participation for solution. ProbJcms at·c stock inquiries that have no specific 
con nection to any particular individual , but111ay be solved by any individual 
through fo llowing a process. Mystery, the preferred avcnu of' query, on the 
other ha11d take up the engagement of the individual and depends on the 
individua.J's participation. ln mystery the individual is the most important 
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demand their engagement: the audience that sits in wait of dimming 
lights engages with Marcel's plays, prepared to be gripped, to be invested , 
to transcend. 
aspect; as to change the questioner wou ld be to alter the quest ion: mystcr 
depends very much on who it is that is ask ing the question. 
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Strife 
During the struggle for freedom, a marked alienation 
from these [religious) practices is observed. The 
native's back is to the wall, the knife is at his throat 
(or, more precisely, the electrode is at his genitals) ... 
Afler centuries of unreality, afler having wallowed in 
the most outlandish phantoms, at long last the native, 
glln in hand, stands face to face with the only forces 
which contend for his life- the forces of colonialism. 
And the youth of a colonized country, growing up in 
an atmosphere of shot and fire, may we!! make a 
mock of, and does not hesitate to pour scorn upon the 
zombies of his ancestors, the horses with two heads, 
the dead who rise again, and the c!J"inns who rtlsh 
into your body while you yawn. The native discovers 
reality and transforms it into the pattern of his 
customs, into the practice of violence and into his plan 
for freedom. 
Frantz F anon, The Wretched of the Earth 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
First of a!! 1 wish to express my deepest gralitud lo 
those who have done me the great honor of awarding 
me the Peace Prize 41. 1 must confess that 1 am very 
happy to receive it. 
41 The Peace Prize of Borsenverein des Deutschen Buch handels was presented 
lo Gabriel Marcel on Seplember 20, 196/i in Frankfurl. 
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it would please me to believe that my work, the 
significance and value of which is subject to m.r 
constant scrutiny the nearer 1 approach the end, 
might have contributed something, be it e(Jer so liule, 
to the cause of peace, which, in my opinion, is far by 
far the most precious of accomplishments. It is not 
s11jjicient to say that peace is good; one must contend 
that it is the basic condition for everything lrllly good. 
Gabriel Marcel, The Philosopher and Peace 
Marcel's method of dramatic engagement calls his audi nee to participate 
in mystery, however there is another type of engagement that resists the 
cloak of my Lique in favor of bold-faced, brutal, transparency. The flip 
side of Marcel's embodied aesthetic i conflict manifest: violence. 
Nietzsche is dead, Hitler is rising, and Marcel is writing. France is under 
subjugation by the azis, and yet violence is con picuously absent in 
Marcel's work. The Lumultuou atmosphere that mo ed ietz che and 
Marx and later artre, Camus, and Ileidegger, who ar li ing and writing 
at the same time as Marcel, hangs heavy in the air. Marcel is not ignorant 
of his situation, and yet his work does not directly giv evidence of his 
location in hi tory. That is, Marc 1 docs not take up the tone o[ violence 
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demonstrated by his fellows. Marcel offers instead an antithetical 
response Lo strife: love. I wish lo draw our attention, briefly, lo the arena 
of strife precisely because it is not the course of action that Marcel Lakes. 
The work of Frantz Fanon, anti-racist, leftist, philosopher and 
psychoanalyst, has resurfaced as oflale because ofFanon's specific 
engagement with violence. Following Marx, Fanon presents violence as a 
revolutionary force; unlike Marx however, it is the peasant, not the 
proletariat, who must rise up in physical protest. It is Fanon's position 
that freedom rests in absolute violcncc42, where violence is a force of 
purification: specifically violence is meant to purge racial categories and 
eliminate the classifications of white and black. 
In The Wretched of the Earth Fanon develops this concept of necessary 
violence within his chosen context of dccolonization. Fanon's contention 
is that whatever name regime change is given, the outcome is always the 
same. Fanon, like Agamben, holds that the modern political landscape is 
42 Frantz Fanon , Tlze Wretched oftlze Earth, trans. Constance Far·ringlon, 
(Penguin Books: Harmondsworth ; Middlesex; England, 1967) p. 37. 
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a constructed terrain wherein the rule of law serves as suppressor of 
violence. As such, violence is constituent Lo revolution, and must not be 
meL with surprise or disgust: violence is a necessity. Fanon sLates: 
The naked truth of decolonization evokes for LLS the 
searing bullets and bloodstained knives which 
emanate from it. For if the last shall be first, this will 
only come to pass after a murderotLS and decisive 
struggle between two protagonists. That affirmed 
intention to place the last at the head of things, and to 
make them climb at a pace (too quickly, some say) the 
well-known steps which characterize an organized 
society, can only triumph if we use all means to turn 
the scale, including, of course, that of violence. 43 
The power of violence, converse Lo institution, is, ironically, its purity. 
Violence here is understood in its hard sense: that bruLe physical force or 
aggression with intent Lo kill. The image of blood and guts is not covered 
up in Fanon, but celebrated as evidence of the violent act. Thus, violence 
is not an illness Lo cure, but a fact of human existence. 
43 Frantz Fanon, Tlze WreLclzed ofllze Earllz , trans. Conslance Farrington , 
(Penguin Books: Harmondsworth; Middlesex; England, 1967) p. 28. 
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Marcel is nol in support of the LotaliLarian regimes of his Lime either, 
however Marcel looks to man's nalure as a human being, and Lhus a 
human doing, ralher Lhan a human killing. The courageous acl is Lo 
aclively reflecl. Marcel stales: 
I mean to bring Lo li'ght the immensely important role 
reflection ought Lo play in the lifo of the political 
leader- and not only reflection, but courage. Unless 
courage is confused with an impulsiveness which is 
merely its most contemptible caricature, it will hrzve lo 
be affirmed that courage and reflection are 
inseparable ... I believe that this lack of reflection and 
courage is the principal reason why false situations, 
or in other words inextricable ones, continue Lo 
multiply in the world today, creating the slate of 
general anxiety felt by everyone who is not simply 
.. 
nawe ... 
fl would be sheer stupidity to interpret these severe 
remarks in a pro- fascist sense. Today it is evident 
thatfascisms of whatever stripe have never been 
anything but sickness of democracy ... 
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The centre of this world [is) threatened at the same 
Lime by collective aberrations and technical excesses, 
what is needed is a reflection decidedly oriented 
toward truth as I have tried, not perhaps to define it, 
but at least Lo approach it. 44 
Violence is not a solution to, but a result of, the broken world in which 
we live. Instead, "the man of faith comes repeatedly the assurance that 
the horizons of our age of violence are not the boundaries of the world as 
it is."45 In this way, Marcel does not put all his eggs in the basket of 
groundedness. With feet firmly planted and engaged with the ground on 
which he stands, Marcel looks forward towards fidelity. 
44 Gabriel Marcel, Tragic Wisdom and Beyond, trans. Stephen Jolin and Peter 
McCormjck, (Northwest Un iversity Press: Evanston, 1973) p . 102-103. 
45 Donald Mackinnon, "Preface"inManAgainstMassSociety, trans. C. S. Fraser, 
(Galcway Edition: Chicago, 1967) p. xi. 
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Love 
Love is patient; love is kind; love is not enviotLs or 
boastful or arrogant or rude. It does not insist on its 
own way; it is not irritable or resentful; it does nol 
r~joice in wrongdoing, but rejoices in the trulft. It 
bares all things, believes all things, hopes all things, 
endures all things. 
Corinthians 13: 1-7 
Love, in so far as distinct from desire or as opposed lo 
desire, love treated as the subordination ofLize self to 
a superior reality, a reality at my deepest level more 
tndy me than 1 am myself- love as the breaking of the 
tension between the self and the other, appears to me 
to be what one might cal! the essential ontological 
datum. 
Gabriel Marcel, .Being and /laving 
Love ailirm being. This is the case, as the realm of love places the 
beloved beyond the talons of finite violence: love makes infinil : lo e 
makes immortal. Sam Keen stales: 
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Within love as it is fully developed there is an 
exigence for perennially, an apprehension of the 
other that 'is' and nothing can destroy what truly is. 
It is precisely within the relationship of love that the 
assurance is given of something that resists, that 
abides, even if all else passes away. »46 
The horizons of our age of violence arc thus eclipsed, and indeed upstaged, 
by love. 
I must pause here to address two points. Firstly, my account of Marcel's 
philosophy thus far might appear somewhat romantic. That is, it might 
appear that philosophical critique has given way to sycophanlism. 
Secondly, we must address the elephant in the room. Marcel is not 
simply an existentialist: Marcel is a Christian existenlialist47 . 
46 Sam Keen , "Tize Development ofLize Idea of Being in Marcel's TlzouglzL" in The 
PlzilosophyoJGabriel Marcel, cd. Paul Arthur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin Hahn , 
(Open Court Publishing Company: La Salle, Lllinois, 1984) p. 109. 
47 The title 'Christ ian existentialist' was given to Marcel by arlr<'. 
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To the first point I must offer the words of Donald MacKinnon48, student 
of Marcel's and scholar in his own right. 
A man who writes as M Marcel does is vulnerable in 
many places: he is admiuedly diJJ use in style, and he 
would admit the reality of his own personal 
prejudices. But as we follow the arguments of his 
book, our many differences with him are subdued by 
his own demanding honesty of mind. 49 
In short, Marcel's work does not solve the world's problems: he docs not 
offer up neatly wrapped solutions for mass consumption. Rather, Marcel 
presents us with a passionate and convincing way of thinking that prefers 
engagement to nihilism. Marcel does not aim to serve up the truth; he 
instead takes issue with man's "illusion and confusion"50 . It is precisely 
48 It would be unfair to MacKinnon, from whom 1 take many of my cues, to ornit 
a char·acterization of Marcel's work that differs from my own. MacKinnon holds 
that Marcel writes violently (Introduction to Man Against Mass Society, 1967, p . 
viii). I disagr·ce. Marcel's writing docs not employ the same brute force as his 
contempor-aries. Mar·ccl writes dramatically and politically, but not violently. In 
writing of violence he does not write violently. 
49 Donald MacKinnon, "introduction" in Man Against Mass Society, (Gateway 
Edition: Chicago, 1967) p. viii. 
so Donald MacKinnon, "introduction" in Man Against Mass Society, (Gateway 
Edition: Chicago, 1967) p. ix 
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this humility that separates Marcel from the pack, not because he has the 
answer but because he asks the question. 
Addressing the second point: when Marcel speaks of love as infinite he 
does not suggest that the truest of lovers will evade death. Rather, Marcel 
is pointing at a specific love that is not mere "carnal appetite"51 : Marcel is 
not speaking of Eros, but of agape. Thus the influence of Christianity 
steers Marcel in a much different existential path from that taken by 
someone like Sartre. 
Marcel is "deeply con<Jinced that there is and there must be a hidden 
cooperation between philosophy and religion 52». This conviction is most 
evident in Marcel's notion of community . Marcel stales: 
I belie<Je that no man, howe<Jer enlightened and holy 
he is, can e<Jer really arri<Je untzlthe others, all 
others, ha<Je started out LO follow him. This is a great 
51 Marcel, Gabriel. Man Against Mass Society, trans C. S. Fraser , (GaLeway 
EdiLion: Chicago, 1967) p . 10. 
52 Gabriel MarceJ, Tragic Wis-dom and Beyond, trans. SLephen Jolin and Pcler 
McCormick, (Northwest University Press: Evanston, 1973) p. 15. 
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truth, and applies lo philosophy as well as 
!. . . 53 re zgwn ... 
The world is broken in essence, but Marcel is unwilling, and unable, to 
extend this brokenness to the whole of human nature. The friction 
between innate brokenness and necessary community is, as I sec it, a 
function of Marcel's Christianity. Marcel struggles against the nihilism 
and ego of his secular and atheistic counterparts who decry the broken 
man. Conversely, Marcel holds that the community must be placed above 
the individual. Furthermore, the individual can only be within the 
context community. Thus, love is preferred to strife as trifc designates 
the warrior as something out ide of society: as a mere function: as Christ 
crucified, left broken, on the cross. 
Brokcnncs is the tie that binds Marcel the Christian to Mar el the 
philosopher, as brokenness is the dynamic force central to hristian 
Trinitarianism 54 and triangular dialcctic55 . It is the cmptinc of the Holy 
53 Gabriel Marcel , Being and Having an E'x·istentiaf Diary, Lrans. Kalhc1·inc Farr<•r, 
(Harper & How: New York, 1965) p. 199-200. 
54 The hrisLian T1·iniLarianism of Marcel 's Homan Catholicism. 
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Spirit that allows for the relation of Cod the Father to the Son of Cod: 
the mediating force of the present absent, the Holy Spirit, is the joint 
between the infinite and the finite. 
Philosophically, brokenness is a feature of Marcel's Nco-Platonism: 
bestowed on Marcel by Bergson. Brokenness becomes the ground and 
the possibility for Marcel's philosophical trinity: incarnation, 
transcendence and being; where being, specifically the feature of being 
that is participation, mediates the relationship between body and 
Lransccn de nee. 
Brokenness, therefore, is not mended by Marcel, as brokenness is the 
condition of the possibility of our transcendence. W c do not heal the 
broken world but transcend it through the selfless, participatory, infinite, 
embodied act of love. 
Love is the human relationship that is grounded, and yet at the same 
Lime transcends. It is love that starts us on the path towards faith and 
55 The triangular dialectic of Marcel 's Nco-Platonism. 
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hope. We might consider the path as such: loving binds us to another 
through fidelity . We hold fidelity lo one another in the face of the 
unknown, and thus promise to be "rcsponsible"56 to, and for, the other. 
Loving nurtures hope, as "hope is inseparable from love" 57 . And now 
these three remain: faith, hope and loCJe58 .in the face of brokenness. It is 
through love, or more correctly loving, that Marcel is able to tackle the 
final threshold of brokenness: death. 
56 Sam Keen , Gabriel Marcel, (John Knox Pre : Richmond , Virginia, 1967) p . 
35. 
Keen specifically points to fidelity as an active process and notiTICI'C constancy 
or tenacity. 
57 Gabriel Marcel, Tragic Wisdom and Beyond, trans. Stephen Jolin and Peter 
McCormick, (Northwest University Press: Evanston, 1973) p. 43. 
58 I Corinthians 13:13 
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I was very pleased with the news from you and Mrs. 
MacKinnon. I can assure that the memories oftlze 
weeks I spent with you at Aberdeen remain with me, 
fully intact. 
As for me, as you will already have noted at the 
beginning of this letter, I am scarcely able LO read 
anymore, and I walk with great difficulty, which 
makes me terribly dependent. A sister of my wife, the 
only one who is still of this world, has been sharing 
my life for the past two years. She is also disabled, 
bw her presence is nevertheless beneficia/to me 
because everyday she reads to me in a loud voice. 
Thank you again, dear friend. I send you my most 
affectionate regards. 
G.M 
Gabriel Marcel, 
Response to Donald MacKinnon 
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The archetype of the solitary philosopher is introduced through the cave 
analogy in Plato's Republic. This model, or philosophical persona59, has 
endured as an ethical prescription of what a philosopher should aspire to 
be: inquisitive, persistent, tortured, and alone. The solitary philosopher 
transcends bondage, shadows, and illusion to arrive at the light of 
knowledge. It is however, in her attempt to share this knowledge with her 
subterranean counterparts that the philosopher is most brutally cast apart 
from the tribe. In their ignorance and fear the cave dwellers silence the 
philosopher through brutal death, preferring instead a life of comfortable 
darkness. 
The characters in Marcel's dramatjc works, by contrast, often begin in 
solitude and conclude in communion. The character Christiane, in Le 
Monde Casser, is separated from those closest to her because of her notion 
that the world is a heart that has stopped beating. Like the solitary 
philosopher, she is disconnected from her own counterparts, a symptom 
59 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What i~ Philosophy?, trans. Graham 
Burche ll and Hugh Tomlinson, ( Columbia University Press: New York, 1991i) p. 
61. 
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of her insight into the broken world60 . Ahhough her knowledge of 
brokenness is the outcome of her existential reflection, Christiane comes 
to understand Lhc imporlancc of relationships and the reaffirmation of 
love and fidelity. Christiane begins olitary, gains knowledge of the 
fracture and sets about to connect. She rejects existential angst in favor 
of existential knowledge: the knowledge of gaudium essendl': Lhc joy of 
existing. It is in Lhc light of joy, of hope, of love, that Mar el insists that 
we approach Lhc terminal threshold. 
It is a uniq uc fate that man, and man alone, has knowl dg of his 
impending death. Marcel offers Lhi point quite coarscl in Tragic Wzsdom 
and Beyond: 
When I try to become aware of my situation as an 
individllal being, and when I consider this sitllation in 
relation LO what I call my jiLLure, I notice that the only 
indubitable proposition seems to be I will die. But I am 
60 Conversely, Plato's solitary philosopher is separated fmm his g•·oup because' 
of his knowledge of unity. 
61 Gabriel Mar·ccl, Tragic WiSdom and Beyond, trans. Stephen Jolin and Pcl<~r 
McCormick, (No1·thwcst Uni ersity Pres :Evanston, 1973), p. 42. 
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completely unable to determine the spatial and 
temporal conditions of my death. In this p erspectii,Je 
my situation resembles the situation of a condemned 
criminal who is locked away in prison with moi,Jable 
walls that are closing in by the minute. 62 
With this said, Marcel contends that we are not in actuality prisoners. 
The despair and hopelessness that we adopt concerning our mortality is a 
function of our free will: " ... when I reflect on the fact that the idea of my 
future death Lends to paralyze my activity, I come to recognize that this is 
possible only with the cooperation of my freedom. "63 We have freely 
chosen to become captives, not captives of finite nature, but captives of a 
functional life that does not permit a true investigation into what death is. 
Our situation, then, is this: we ought not ei,Jen to say, 
as the Stoics said, that e"en at the "ery worst there 
remains for us a possibility of suicide, as a happy way 
out. That is no longer a true statement of the case. A 
man LO-day can be put in a situation in which he will 
62 Gabriel Marcel, Tragic WiSdom andBeyond, trans. Stephen Jolin and Peter 
McCormick, (Northwest University Press: Evanston, 1973) p. 42. 
63 Gabriel Marcel , Tragic WiSdom andBeyond, trans. Stephen Jolin and Peter 
McCormick, (Northwest University Press: Evanston, 1973) p. 42-43. 
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no longer want to kill himself; in which suicide will 
appear to him as an illicit or unfair way out; in 
which he will think of himself as under an obligation 
not merely to suffer, but to wish for, the punishment 
appropriate Lo crimes which he will impute to himself 
without having commiued them64. 
W c arc willing to live out a fate worse than death because we have taken 
up a burlesque of what it is to die. In this way, our choice to live in fear 
of death leads us to a life for death: we live each moment so wrapped up in 
fear of our final moment that we do not truly live al all. In running from 
our mortality we are running towards nihilism and all the dangers of 
functionalism Lhal Marcel has warned us of previously. Death is nola 
force Lo hide from, death itself is easily overcome by living. Death is Lo be 
overcome by gaudium essendi. Sam Keen stales: 
Marcel's ontology does not move toward any 
systematic understanding of being but rather among 
64 Gabriel Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, trans. C. S . Fraser (Gateway 
Edition: Chicago, 1967) p. 19. 
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those experiences that are immanent assurances of 
the presence of being: love, fidelity, faith, and hope. 6:5 
Furthermore, the notion that death serves as an antagonist to life is false. 
The true opposite of life is functional existence: the type of existence that 
obliges one to suffer: this life, according Lo both Marcel and Agamben, is 
epitomized by life within the walls of the concentration camp. 
Death, then, must be understood as the conclusion of life. In this shared 
relationship life and death run together and are very much a part of one 
another. Thus choosing the activity of life implies the activity of death, 
where dying is not passive, but an active crossing over: life's final action. 
In this way, when Marcelian commentator Seymour Cain stales: "absolute 
fidelity to a being transcends and conquers death"66, he is almost correct. 
6S Sam Kcc n, "The Development of the Idea of Being in Marcels Thought " in The 
Philosop~yofGabrielMarcel, ed. Paul Arthur SchiJpp and Lewis Edwin Hahn, 
(Open Court Publishing Company: La SaJ ie, llJinois, 1984) p. 117 
66 Seymour Cain, Gabriel Marcel, (Regncry/Gateway Inc.: South 13cnd, Jndiana, 
1963) p . 86. 
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In truth: absolute fidelity to being a being transcends and conquers 
death. 
The realm of brokenness is th finite realm of our human-being. In 
human being and human doing we transcend the brokenness that is 
egocentricity and violence. Marcel urge us to reflect, to act and to love 
thereby affirming our existential haractcr. In death we lo e the feature of 
cmbodim nt, but the body must perish so that the cxi tcnlial might 
transcend. 
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